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The likely extension of the euro area has triggered a debate on the organization of the ECB, in 
particular on the apparent mismatch between relative economic size and voting rights in the 
Council. We present a simple model of optimal representation in a federal central bank 
addressing this question. Optimal voting weights reflect two opposing forces: the wish to 
insulate common monetary policy from changing preferences at the national level, and the 
attempt to avoid an overly active or passive reaction to idiosyncratic national economic 
shocks. A perfect match between economic size and voting rights is rarely optimal, and 
neither is the “one country, one vote principle”. Empirically, there are indications that the 
pattern of over- and under-representation of member countries in the ECB Council might be 
extreme by the standards of the US Fed and German Bundesbank and not always optimal. 
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Whether within the Convention or in bodies such as the European
Central Bank, representatives of the large countries believe they are
under threat of being tied up by a gang of small countries, which are
by de￿nition irresponsible and which, following enlargement, will form
the majority within the Council in terms of numbers.
R. Goebbels, MEP Luxembourg (European Parliament 2003)
1 Introduction
The likely extension of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) has trig-
gered a lively debate on the organization of monetary policy in the euro area.
Following a suggestion by the European Central Bank (ECB), current EMU
member governments have agreed on a plan to reform the ECB￿ s organiza-
tional structure with a view to (i) better match the economic and political
weights of member countries in the ECB Council and (ii) limit the overall
size of the Council.1
While there is variation in detail, it is probably fair to say that most
academic papers discussing the merits of the reform (or its necessity) agree
that limiting the overall size of the ECB Council is a crucial step to ensure
e¢ ciency in monetary policymaking in the euro area.2 Already today the
ECB Council is exceptionally large in terms of members and￿ even after
the reform￿ euro area enlargement might leave the ECB with ￿too many
[members] to decide on where to go to dinner,￿as Baldwin (2001) remarked.
There is less agreement, however, on whether￿ or to what degree￿ correcting
the existing lack of correlation between the member countries￿economic size
and their voting power is sound policy. The current ECB structure, by
following the ￿one country, one vote￿principle, gives economically smaller
countries a disproportional large vote. EMU enlargement is likely to am-
plify this problem, even with ECB reform. Most (if not all) prospective new
members are small enough to be over-represented even after the reform; they
1The reform has been agreed to at the government level, but formal rati￿cation by
current member states is pending.
2Studies discussing these and related arguments include, among others, Baldwin et al.
(2001), Hefeker (2002), Gros et al. (2002), Fitoussi and Creel (2002), de Grauwe (2003),
and Meade (2003).
2also show stark di⁄erences in economic development compared to current
members (de Haan et al. 2004).
The over-representation of smaller member states could introduce a bias
into the ECB￿ s decision-making. The Maastricht treaty would have the ECB
stabilize in￿ ation within the euro area using the Harmonized Consumption
Price Index.3 This encourages the ECB to take a European perspective by
evaluating the potential impact of national economic developments on euro
area in￿ ation based on the respective relative economic size of a member
country. If national central bank governors put at least some weight on
national economic developments, their over-representation could distort this
perspective by directing monetary policy toward national issues.
So does the plan for ECB reform fall short? The answer is far from
clear. While reducing the degree of over-representation will ensure that the
decision-making process within the ECB Council will be more likely to re-
semble the perspective of a benevolent European social planner, there are a
number of arguments that caution against a too ambitious reform. For in-
stance, Gros and Hefeker (2002) and Benigno (2004) point out that over- and
under-representation of member countries in the planner￿ s target function or,
equivalently, in the distribution of voting rights within the actual ECB Coun-
cil, could be optimal if transmission mechanisms di⁄er. How important these
di⁄erences might be is, however, mostly an empirical question.4 Another ar-
gument is made by Casella (1992), who points out that over-representation
could be a necessary condition for smaller countries to join a currency union.
The present paper adds central bank independence as a potentially crucial
argument to this debate.5 We focus on the need for federal central banks such
as the ECB to strive for both political independence from, and fair represen-
tation of, member states on their policymaking bodies. We show that the
interplay between two opposing forces￿ (i) the wish to reduce the impact of
national preference shocks on union-wide policymaking, and (ii) the attempt
to minimize misrepresentation of any one country￿ s relative economic size so
as to avoid over- or under-reactions to national economic shocks￿ determines
the optimal representation of national interest on the Council. Calibrating
Council representation to moderate the impact of preference shocks helps to
3Euro area in￿ ation is computed by Eurostat using a weighted average of (harmonized)
current euro area member in￿ ation rates, where the weights are based on relative expen-
diture on ￿nal private domestic consumption. The distribution of relative consumption
very closely mirrors that of relative GDP.
4Ciccarelli and Rebucci (2002) present evidence that suggests that transmission mech-
anisms have become fairly similar among current EMU members already during the 1990s.
5Advantages of the ￿one country, one vote￿principle based on considerations of political
economy are also discussed in Berger (2002) and Berger et al. (2004).
3insulate common monetary policy from unwanted volatility when national
targets might deviate from the common policy goal. Matching Council rep-
resentation and economic weight, on the other hand, ensures that actual
monetary policy stabilizes national economic shocks in line with the union
ideal.
Optimal representation will, as a rule, weigh both arguments, re￿ ecting
economic size as well as the stochastic properties of economic and preference
shocks. As a consequence, whether a country will be optimally over- or
under-represented compared to its relative economic size depends on all these
determinants. While one might expect that most small countries would be
over-represented and most large countries would be under-represented (as is
the case in the ECB today), this does not always hold true. For instance, it
might be optimal to over-represent a large country if its policy preferences
are very stable relative to other union members.
In what follows, Section 2 will brie￿ y review recent related literature. Sec-
tion 3 describes the model, the ￿rst-best benchmark policy, and derives the
conditions for optimal representation of national interests within a currency
union in the presence of economic and preference shocks. Section 4 allows for
dependencies between shocks and hints at the impact of continued integration
in the economic and preference domain on optimal representation. Section
5 provides a robustness check by allowing for alternative sources of national
preference shocks. Section 6 attempts to put everything into perspective by
comparing the degree of over- and under-representation relative to economic
size for the ECB, the US Federal Reserve, and the German Bundesbank. In
addition, determinants of optimal representation identi￿ed by the theoretical
model are compared with actual misrepresentation within the ECB. Finally,
Section 7 draws some conclusions.
2 Relation to Recent Literature
Our contribution is related to three intertwined strands in the literature
on central bank design. One, including von Hagen and S￿ppel (1994) and
Lohmann (1997, 1998), asks whether a central bank with a centralized or a
decentralized structure is better suited to cope with partisan policy making
at the national level. The argument is involved, but in general strong national
representation in the joint central bank Council often leads to ine¢ ciencies
at the union level. For instance, in the Lohmann (1997) model, a more
decentralized central bank organization increases the frequency at which the
Council￿ s median voter (and, thus, central bank policy) changes, resulting in
unwanted volatility in monetary policy.
4This contrasts with a somewhat more recent body of papers discussing
the e¢ ciency of alternative decision-making structures (see Gerling et al.
(2003) for a survey). Gerlach-Kristen (2002), for instance, argues that com-
mittees with multiple members might be better suited than single individu-
als to process information, fostering e¢ cient decision-making￿ a theoretical
result supported by experimental evidence produced by Blinder and Mor-
gan (2002).6 Since much of the information that federal central banks are
processing is regional, this can be taken to suggest that regional or national
representation in the Council has advantages (Maier et al. 2003).7 Thus, full
centralization would not be optimal.
A third group of papers takes the in￿ uence of national interest on central
bank Council policies as given￿ either because full centralization might not
be optimal or because national representation is too deeply ingrained into
the political setup of the currency union to be abandoned any time soon.
The question is then how to deal with shocks to national preferences within
a federal central bank system. The best-known contributions addressing this
question include Waller and Walsh (1996), who suggest long and overlapping
contracts for Council members as a device to moderate the impact of national
preference shocks (see also Lindner 2000), an idea already re￿ ected in the
actual term structure of ECB Council members.
Other recent proposals remain largely theoretical to date. The ￿rst such
proposal would institute ￿ exible majority rules for Council decisions (Gers-
bach and Pachl 2004). These rules would attempt to moderate demands for
policy changes based on idiosyncratic national economic shocks by raising the
majority requirements in line with the size of the desired interest rate change.
A second proposal, from Heisenberg (2003), argues that increasing the trans-
parency of Council decision-making would diminish national in￿ uences on
policies, helping to constrain the problem of national preference shocks at
its source. Finally, Bullard and Waller (2004) discuss the advantages of al-
ternative decision-making arrangements, including simple majority voting,
bargaining, and a supermajority design, in a general equilibrium framework.
The present paper adds to this small but growing literature. As we will
argue below, optimizing over- or under-representation of national representa-
tives on the federal central bank Council compared to the relative economic
size of their respective countries is another tool that can be used to moderate
the impact of national preference shocks on the common monetary policy.
6Gersbach and Hahn (2001) explore similar issues from a transparency perspective.
7Also see Goodfriend (2000). Alan Greenspan frequently stresses that the information
provided by the presidents of the regional Federal Reserve Banks ￿contribute[s] vitally to
the formulation of monetary policy￿(Greenspan 2000, p. 2) in the case of the U.S. Federal
Reserve System.
5Whether the observed misrepresentation of economic size in the ECB Coun-
cil can be reconciled with the theoretical argument is, of course, another,
ultimately empirical, question. We shall revisit this issue toward the end of
the paper.
3 The Model
3.1 The Economy and the First-Best Policy
The output gap in each member country of the currency union i, de￿ned as
the percentage deviation of the actual output level from the level of natural
output yn
i , is given by a standard Lucas supply function
yi = ￿ ￿ ￿







In what follows, we will assume that decision-makers are well aware of the
limits the Lucas function puts on real activity in the long run. In￿ ation, ￿, is
assumed to be similar across the currency union, that is, ￿ = ￿i = ￿6=i, and
under the full control of the common central bank. In￿ ation expectations,
denoted by ￿e, are set rationally, so that ￿e = E￿. The last term in equa-
tion (1), ￿i, is a country-speci￿c economic shock with zero mean and known
(positive) variance.
A reasonable assumption￿ one that seems to be broadly in line with the
spirit of the Maastricht treaty in the example of the ECB or the policy targets
pursued by the US Federal Reserve￿ is that the ￿rst-best policy minimizes a
standard quadratic loss function based on the deviations of in￿ ation and the








The term ￿￿ > 0 is an exogenous in￿ ation target, say 2 percent, and ￿ is a
coe¢ cient measuring the relative weight attached to output stabilization. We
assume that the latter ful￿lls 0 < ￿ < 1. The target level for the aggregate
output gap has been set to zero, ensuring that the ￿rst-best policy does not
su⁄er from a time inconsistency problem. The aggregate output gap is the
weighted sum of the respective national output gaps, that is, y =
X
￿iyi,
where we can de￿ne the economic weights of each country as the expected




i . This allows us to express
L￿ as
L







6or, in the two-country case,
L
￿ = (￿ ￿ ￿
￿)
2 + ￿(￿y1 + (1 ￿ ￿)y2)
2 ; (2)
where ￿ and (1 ￿ ￿) denote the relative economic weight of country 1 and
country 2, respectively. In what follows, we will focus on the two-country
case for simplicity.
The social planner sets in￿ ation by minimizing (2), taking into account
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where ’￿1;￿2 marks the coe¢ cient of correlation (and ’￿1;￿2￿￿1￿￿2 the covari-
ance) between economic shocks in countries 1 and 2. The covariance term
appears in EL￿ because, while the central bank ￿leans against the wind￿
with its stabilization policy, it never fully compensates economic shocks in
either country as long as the relative weight of the real term in the underlying
loss function L￿ is not in￿nitely high.
3.2 Actual Decision-Making
The purely union-wide perspective employed to derive the benchmark solu-
tion might not be a good description of actual decision-making in a federal
central bank. While, for instance, the ECB (1999, p. 55) rightfully stresses
that ￿members of the [Council] do not act as national representatives, but
7in a fully independent personal capacity,￿there is reason to assume that na-
tional economic considerations play at least some role in the voting behavior
of governors in the Council.8 This assumption is supported by evidence of
national (or regional) in￿ uences in other federal central bank systems. Berger
and de Haan (2002) show that regional di⁄erences in growth and in￿ ation
in￿ uenced voting behavior in the pre-1999 Bundesbank Council; Meade and
Sheets (2002) ￿nd that Federal Reserve FOMC members do take into ac-
count developments in regional unemployment when deciding monetary pol-
icy; and Heinemann and Huefner (2004) and Meade and Sheets (2002) argue
that there might even be indications of regional voting behavior in actual
ECB policy.
A simple, yet plausible, description of actual decision-making within the
common central bank is a weighted voting approach or a form of Nash-
bargaining in which voting weights are the fall-back positions.9 In this case,




where ￿i denotes the political weight of country i￿ s representative or governor
in the Council, with
P
￿i = 1. In other words, the loss function underlying
actual central bank decisions is seen as a weighted sum of the individual loss
functions of the member countries, Li, where the political weights can di⁄er
from the economic weights, that is, ￿i R ￿i.
Before moving on, note that the description of actual decision-making in
the currency union￿ s central bank Council ignores the role of a Board. In
the current ECB, the Board casts 6 out of 18 votes in the Council; in the
US Federal Reserves￿FOMC the Board holds 7 out of 12 votes. Not taking
into account the Board can be justi￿ed by the notion that the Board is likely
to target a loss function similar to the social planner￿ s described in (2). In
the case of the ECB, for instance, the EU Treaty speci￿es that the Board is
appointed by ￿common accord of the governments of the member states at
the level of Heads of State or Government, on a recommendation from the
Council, after it has consulted the European Parliament and the Governing
Council of the ECB￿(EU 1997, Article 112 2. (b)). Arguably, this political
8The assumption that national interests play at least some role also is fairly wide-spread
in the academic literature. See, among others, the contributions by von Hagen and S￿ppel
(1994), Lindner (2000), Aksoy et al. (2002), Gros and Hefeker (2002, 2003), Gersbach and
Pachl (2004), and Frey (2004).
9This representation of decision-making abstracts from possible strategic interaction
between Council members. For an analysis of coalition forming in the Council in light of
EMU enlargement see, for instance, Baldwin et al. (2001).
8process, which is highly centralized at the European level, tends to select
Board members with a euro area-wide peespective. With the Board following
a ￿rst best or Maastricht policy, however, analysis of possible deviations
of ECB behavior from the Maastricht norm should focus (without loss of
generality) on the behavior of national representatives.10
But how will national central bank governors act in the Council? As
already discussed, we assume that they base their decisions on a loss function
thought to measure country i0s welfare:







i (to which we will return in a moment) is the target level for in￿ ation.
This speci￿cation resembles that of the social planner with respect to
the absence of an in￿ ationary bias. As in (2), the loss function of country i
includes a real target compatible with the level of natural output in country
i, and we assume that the relative weight of the real argument in (4), ￿, is
the same as in the ￿rst-best scenario.
There is, however, a di⁄erence with respect to the in￿ ation bliss point.











that is, country i￿ s in￿ ation target might deviate from the common target,
￿￿, by a preference shock "i with zero mean and known variance ￿2
"i.
Preference shocks can occur for various reasons, but the most natural
explanation ties them to changing (partisan) government preferences con-
cerning in￿ ation. For instance, Hibbs (1977) and Alesina (1987) argue that
policymakers￿ and thus the governments selecting the national governors in
the currency union￿ s central bank Council￿ have di⁄erent objective func-
tions, including (but not necessarily restricted to) the in￿ ation target. As a
consequence, shocks to the composition of government can lead to unexpected
changes in national preferences concerning in￿ ation. Alesina and Rosenthal
(1995) discuss empirical evidence to support this view. A related theory, put
forth by Bullard and Waller (2004), argues that changing preferences con-
cerning in￿ ation might re￿ ect random changes in the political dominance of
agents loosing (savers, for instance) and gaining (such as borrowers and wage
earners) from high in￿ ation. This could in￿ uence the selection of national
10Frey (2004) takes a comparable view of the Board￿ s perspective. He concludes that, as
a consequence, in an OCA-type model, larger member countries prefer a more important
role for the Board than smaller members.
9central bank governors for the common Council.11
An alternative, non political-economic, approach would interpret the shocks,
"i, as country-speci￿c deviations from the broader trend of structural in￿ a-
tion (along the lines of Balassa-Samuelson).12
While targeted in￿ ation is a plausible explanation for the discord between
di⁄erent national Council members, it is not, of course, the only possible
channel through which national preference shocks could in￿ uence common
monetary policy. In particular, there could be partisan shocks to the pre-
ferred output gap or to the relative weight of the real argument in (4). How-
ever, allowing the output target instead of the in￿ ation target to ￿ uctuate
around zero at the national level has little impact on the analysis. The same
holds, broadly speaking, for preference shocks to ￿. We shall return to this
issue further below.
To compute actual central bank policy in the two-country case, we sub-

































e ￿ ￿￿1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿2); (7)
which, under rational expectations, implies the following actual equilibrium













[(￿"1 + (1 ￿ ￿)"2 ￿ ￿￿￿1 + (1 + ￿￿)￿2] ￿ y2A:
11A related interpretation would be to assume that preference shocks re￿ ect exogenous
changes in ￿scal fortitude, where, for example, governments with unexpectedly high de￿cits
will adjust their in￿ ation preferences upward.
12It has been argued, for instance, that the ECB￿ s in￿ ation target of (less then) 2 percent
does not adequately re￿ ect the Balassa-Samuelson e⁄ect, especially for the EU accession
countries still on a real convergence path to the EMU core (Berger et. al 2004). In this case
equation (5) should be seen as a special case of the more general form ￿￿
i = ￿￿+￿ ￿i+"i, with
the (somewhat unrealistic) assumption that the contribution of trend structural in￿ ation
to the national in￿ ation target, ￿ ￿i , will be zero across countries. Note, however, that
allowing ￿ ￿i > 0, while introducing an additional dimension in the discussion of optimal
representation, would not alter the thrust of the results of the analysis.
104 Optimal Representation
Substituting ￿A;y1A, and y2A in (2) and taking expectations, we can com-
pute the expected welfare loss associated with the actual monetary policy,
EL￿ (￿A;y1A;y2A) (see Appendix 1). The optimal representation of coun-
try 1, ￿￿, is simply the value of ￿ that minimizes the di⁄erence between
EL￿ (￿A;y1A;y2A) and expected welfare under the ￿rst-best policy, that is
￿
￿ , argmin[EL
￿ (￿A;y1A;y2A) ￿ EL
￿ (￿FB;y1FB;y2FB)]:
Country 2￿ s optimal weight is, equivalently, 1 ￿ ￿￿.
Optimal representation will depend not only on the weight of the real
argument in the loss function, ￿, and the economic weight, ￿, but also on
both countries￿economic and preference shocks and their possible interaction
terms (see Appendix 1).
In the next Section we will take a closer look at what de￿nes optimal
representation, with a focus on its relation to a country￿ s economic weight.
To facilitate the analysis, we will start with the assumption that all shocks
are independent. Analysis in subsequent Sections will allow for correlated
shocks across and within countries.
4.1 The Baseline Case with Independent Shocks
Assuming that ’"1;"2 = ’￿1;￿2 = ’"i;￿i = ’"i;￿6=i = 0 for i = 1;2, the optimal















which obviously satis￿es 0 < ￿￿ < 1 because ￿ < 1 and ￿2
"1 > 0.
4.1.1 Over- and under-representation
Equation (8) has a straightforward implication for the relation between eco-
nomic size and a country￿ s optimal voting weight. In particular, we ￿nd
that
￿
￿ R ￿ , ￿￿
2
"1 Q (1 ￿ ￿)￿
2
"2: (9)
Broadly speaking, equation (9) states that over-representation in the
Council in relation to a country￿ s economic size is more likely to be optimal
for smaller countries with relatively stable preferences. Under-representation,
on the other hand, is more likely to be optimal for larger countries with rel-
11atively volatile preferences. This becomes even clearer if we rewrite (9) to
highlight the tension between economic size and relative preference stability:
￿







Obviously, over-representation is optimal if a country￿ s share in the currency
union￿ s GDP is lower than a critical threshold value, ￿P, measuring the
other country￿ s relative contribution to overall preference volatility. Vice
versa, under-representation is optimal when a country is large relative to the
other currency union member￿ s contribution to preference volatility.
The threshold value ￿P has an interesting interpretation. Note that ac-
cording to (8) and (10), ￿￿ ! ￿P as ￿2
￿1;￿2
￿2 ! 0, that is, ￿P can be inter-
preted as the optimal political voting weight that results purely from trading
o⁄di⁄erences in the volatility of preferences between countries in the absence
of economic shocks.
Equivalently, in the absence of preference shocks, the optimal political
weight, ￿￿, converges with a country￿ s relative economic weight, ￿, which,
according to equation (2), is the weight it should receive under the ￿rst-best
scenario: ￿￿ ! ￿ as ￿2
"1;￿2
"2 ! 0.
This suggests the following observation.
Remark 1 In general, optimal representation balances two opposing forces:
the wish to reduce the impact of preference shocks on monetary policy (by
bringing ￿￿ as close as possible to ￿P), and the attempt to limit misrep-
resentation of a country￿ s relative economic size to avoid an overly active
or passive reaction to national economic shocks (by keeping ￿￿ as closely as
possible to ￿).
As a consequence, a country￿ s optimal representation in the Council, ￿￿,
will always be in an interval de￿ned by ￿ on the one hand and ￿P on the
other. Thus, whether a country will be over- or under-represented depends
on the relative size of the country and the characteristics of both countries￿








Figure 1. An Illustration of the Baseline Model.
Intuitively, we would expect small countries to be over-represented and
large countries to be under-represented, but this is not necessarily the case.
However, the intuitive scenario is the outcome if preferences are similar across
the currency union:13
Remark 2 If preference shocks were su¢ ciently similar, over-representation
would always be optimal for small countries and under-representation would
always be optimal for large countries.
On the other hand, if di⁄erences in preference shocks are stark, there is
room for a counterintuitive result:
Remark 3 Under-representation of a small country can be optimal if its in-
￿ation preferences are relatively volatile. By the same token, over-representation
of a large country can be optimal if its in￿ation preferences are stable in com-
parison. Size continues to be important, however, as these outcomes are less
likely for very small or very large countries, respectively.







for ￿￿ > ￿. Thus, a large country
with ￿ > 1=2 can only be over-represented if ￿2
"1 < ￿2
"2. By the same logic,
￿￿ < ￿ requires ￿2
"1 > ￿2
"2 for a small country with ￿ < 1=2. The inequali-
ties for over- and under-representation are both more likely to be ful￿lled if
j￿ ￿ 1=2j ! 0.
Figure 2 depicts the two scenarios discussed in the Remark.
13Equation (9) reduces to ￿￿ R ￿ , ￿ Q (1 ￿ ￿) when ￿2
"1 = ￿2
"2. Obviously, similar
outcomes can be found for asymmetrcial preference shocks as long as the di⁄erences in
preferences remain small compared to the di⁄erences in economic size.
13S c
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Figure 2. Under- (Over-) Represented Small (Large) Countries
The above analysis suggests that the counterintuitive case of, for instance,
a large country being over-represented, is most relevant when the actual
overall di⁄erence in country sizes within the union is small. In the extreme
case of a monetary union of economic equals (i.e., when ￿ = (1 ￿ ￿) =
1=2), asymmetry in representation would always be optimal if there were
asymmetries in preference shocks. As Figure 1 illustrates, in such a case
countries with relatively more volatile in￿ ation preferences would receive less
than ￿ =1/2 (and countries with relatively less volatile in￿ ation preferences
would receive more than ￿ =1/2 ) of the voting rights in the joint central
bank Council.
Finally, equation (9) sheds light on the ￿one country, one vote￿principle
featured so prominently in the debate on ECB reform. It shows that:
Remark 4 In the absence of economic shocks and if preference shocks are
symmetrical, optimal representation in the Council follows the ￿one country,
one vote￿principle no matter the distribution of economic size.
While this Remark does not quite rule out ￿one country, one vote￿as
an optimal solution, it marks it as a rather special case. Equations (8) and
(10) imply ￿￿ = 1 ￿ ￿￿ = ￿P = 1=2 when economic shocks are absent (i.e.
￿2
￿1;￿2





How does optimal representation change with the characteristics of economic
and preference shocks? As one would expect, inspection of (8) reveals a clear-
cut relation between representation and preference stability.
14Remark 5 An increase in the volatility of preference shocks unconditionally
reduces the optimal weight a country receives in the Council.
This should not come as a surprise. If optimal representation indeed bal-
ances the attempt to correctly mirror a country￿ s relative economic size with
the need to reduce the impact of national preference shocks on the Council,
a country that su⁄ers a decrease in preferences stability will see its opti-
mal representation in the currency union￿ s central bank being reduced. The
￿nding is independent of the initial degree of over- or under-representation.
In contrast, the impact of a marginal increase in economic volatility de-
pends on a country￿ s initial status.
Remark 6 An increase in economic volatility in a country reduces the gap
between economic weight and optimal representation. Over-represented coun-
tries will see their optimal voting weight reduced, while under-represented
countries will see their optimal voting right increased.
Proof. Taking the partial derivative of (8) and rearranging yields @￿￿=@￿￿1 R
0 , ￿￿2
"1 R (1 ￿ ￿)￿2
"2, which, by (9), implies the result.
For given country size, neglecting economic shocks in favor of moderating
preference shocks becomes more expensive (in welfare terms) as economic
volatility increases. As a consequence, a country which is burdened with a









Figure 3. An Increase in Economic Volatility in Country 1.
154.2 Optimal Representation With Correlated Shocks
Allowing for dependencies between economic and political shocks across coun-
tries and within a country is interesting on at least on two counts. First,
introducing non-zero correlated shocks allows us to shed some light on the
question of how closer integration of currency union member countries in￿ u-
ences optimal representation. There is, for instance, the question of whether
closer synchronization of business cycles will change the trade-o⁄underlying
optimal representation in favor of economic size or preference stability. In
addition, allowing for dependencies between shocks serves as a robustness
check for the baseline results built on the assumption of zero correlations.
4.2.1 Correlated Economic Shocks
Economic shocks is one obvious area where there could be cross-country
dependencies. As discussed above, even under the ￿rst-best scenario, the
central bank would only ￿lean against the wind￿and not fully compensate
for an economic shock impacting all member countries of the currency union.
This could mean that the ￿residual￿country shocks will continue to in￿ uence
all member countries in a correlated fashion. The correlation could be pos-
itive or negative. An example for a common shock with positive correlation
would be an unanticipated change in oil prices. On the other hand, a sur-
prise depreciation of the common currency, for instance, might help members
that are net-exporters but hurt others that are net-importers, resulting in a
negative correlation of economic shocks across countries.
The ￿rst insight from the model is that the baseline results on optimal
representation hardly change when we allow for cross-country correlation of
economic shocks. Allowing for ’￿1;￿2 6= 0 but otherwise following the same
steps as before, we ￿nd that the optimal weight for country 1 resembles (8),
except for additional (additive) terms involving the cross-country covariance
of economic shocks, ’￿1;￿2￿￿1￿￿2. In fact, the condition determining whether
a country will be optimally over- or under-represented compared to its eco-
nomic weight is identical to (9) in the no-correlation case. This generalizes
and strengthens the baseline ￿ndings. Appendix 2 lays out the formal results
in some detail.
A second ￿nding can be summarized as follows:
Remark 7 As the currency union￿ s economies become more similar in terms
of their economic shocks, countries with relatively stable preferences are likely
to see their optimal voting weight increase.
The rationale is￿ in line with the discussion of equation (10) earlier￿
that increased business cycle synchronization reduces the cost of moderating
16the impact of preference shocks on monetary policy, because a possible mis-
representation of economic size is now less likely to lead to a deviation of
stabilization policy from its ￿rst-best benchmark.
Two comparative-static results lead to this conclusion (see Appendix 2).
First, when business cycles are positively correlated across the currency
union, and when country 1￿ s economy is less volatile than country 2￿ s to
start with, then an increase in economic volatility in country 1, ￿￿1, will
make the two economies more similar. In this case, it becomes less costly
to o⁄set preference shocks by allowing voting rights to deviate from relative
economic size. As a consequence, optimal representation requires that the
country￿ s optimal weight in monetary policy decisions should be based more
on preference shock considerations, and the spread between economic and
political weights in the currency union grows.14 The second relevant result is
that a higher coe¢ cient of correlation between economic shocks will lead to
higher optimal representation for the country initially over-represented and
vice versa. Thus, once again, as economic shocks become more similar, the
optimal spread between economic and political weights in the currency union
increases.
This analysis suggests that currency unions should optimally pay more
attention to relative preference stability considerations as their joint economy
￿matures￿and becomes increasingly more integrated. If integration implies
an increasing likeness of economic shocks, preference stability considerations
should eventually dominate the calculation of members￿optimal Council rep-
resentation. In somewhat more formal terms: we ￿nd that ￿￿ approaches the
optimal weight in the absence of economic shocks, ￿P, as the correlation be-
tween national economic shocks approaches positive unity and the di⁄erence
between the volatility of economic shocks reduces to zero.15
4.2.2 Correlated preference shocks
Next, we allow for correlation between preference shocks while assuming zero
correlation between all other shocks. The idea is that surprise changes in
in￿ ation preferences might well take the form of union-wide ￿mood swings￿
that simultaneously a⁄ect all member countries and their representatives in
the common central bank. Alternatively, one might speculate that preference
changes are negatively correlated across countries.
While the optimal weight in this scenario once again resembles (8) in the
14To be precise, country 1￿ s optimal representation in the Council increases if it was
initially over-represented relative to its economic weight, and it decreases if it was initially
under-represented. See Appendix 2.
15Note that ￿P remains unchanged from the baseline scenario (see Appendix 2).
17case with independent shocks, allowing for ’"1;"2 6= 0 in￿ uences the condition
determining whether a country will be over- or under-represented compared
to its economic size (see Appendix 3). In particular, if preference shocks
are positively correlated, it might be optimal to over-represent (or under-
represent) member countries with very stable (or very unstable) preferences
irrespective of their economic size. The intuition is that a positive correla-
tion of preference shocks across countries reduces the chance that national
preference shocks will neutralize each other within the Council. Increasing
the voting weight of countries with very stable preference can be optimal to
minimize the resulting unwanted volatility in joint monetary policy.
In addition, we can make a statement that parallels the similarity result
in the case with correlated economic shocks:16
Remark 8 As currency union member countries become more similar in
terms of their preference shocks, economically large countries are likely to
see their optimal voting weight increase and small countries are likely to see
their optimal voting weights decrease.
The rationale behind this rests on the implied change in the balance of
forces driving optimal representation. In this case, greater likeness of pref-
erence shocks reduces the potential gains from moderating these shocks by
letting optimal voting weights deviate from economic size, thereby allowing
preference shocks to compensate each other in the Council. As a conse-
quence, large countries (which are more likely to be under-represented when
shocks become more similar) should see their voting weights being increased
and small (probably over-represented) countries should see them reduced.
Two comparative-static results support this conclusion (see Appendix 3).
First, a rise in the correlation of preference shocks will increase a country￿ s
optimal voting weight if it is large in economic terms and its preferences
are relatively stable. Second, an increase in country 1￿ s preference volatility
that brings its volatility level closer to country 2￿ s will lead to a decrease in
its optimal representation. Since, in this case, country 1 was blessed with
more stable preferences at the outset, it was also over-represented before the
change. As a consequence, the decrease in optimal representation brings its
voting weight closer to its economic weight.
The above analysis implies that increasing likeness of preference shocks￿
arguably a possibility within an ever more integrated currency union such as
the U.S. or the European Union￿ should prompt the currency union to better
tailor Council voting weights to members￿economic size. It is straightforward
16See Appendix 3. The calculations assume that the starting point for ￿￿ is not too
extreme, that is, that we start from an interior solution.
18to show that ￿￿ approaches ￿ as the correlation between national preference
shocks approaches positive unity, and the di⁄erence between the volatility
of these shocks reduces to zero. Note that this possible ￿integration e⁄ect￿
runs counter to the implications of increasing likeness of economic shocks
discussed in the previous Section.
4.2.3 Correlated Economic and Preference Shocks
If preference shocks are, at least in part, a consequence of changes in govern-
ment, and if changes in government are in￿ uenced by economic conditions,
preference and economic shocks might not be independent from each other.
In fact, there is room for something akin to a political business cycle. For
instance, one can imagine that voters elect a government that is more toler-
ant to in￿ ation when economic activity is in decline, giving rise to a negative
correlation between economic and preference shocks.
As with cross-country correlations, allowing preference shocks to be cor-
related with economic shocks within country 1 (i.e. , ’"1;￿1 6= 0) changes
optimal representation and the conditions for over- or under-representations
compared to the baseline (see Appendix 4)￿ albeit not fundamentally. Inter-
estingly, however, under certain conditions a strong political business cycle
in the sense just discussed might make it optimal to decrease a country￿ s
voting weight below its relative economic size.
Remark 9 A negative correlation between preference shocks and economic
shocks (a ￿political business cycle￿ ) ampli￿es country 1￿ s policy demands
in the Council after economic shocks￿ making optimal under-representation
more likely.
The rationale behind this ￿nding is that a negative correlation of output
and preference shocks in country 1 increases the cost of over-representing a
country in the Council. To see this, note that, according to equation (7), the










Over-representation of country 1 would mean that, for instance, a negative
shock to the output gap (￿1 < 0) would trigger a too expansionary monetary
policy at the union level, as country 1￿ s preferred policy reaction (￿￿1￿=(1+
￿) > 0) would receive greater in￿ uence on Council decisions than suggested
by its economic weight. This policy request would be further ampli￿ed if
17Set ￿ = 1 in equation (7) to arrive at the expression shown here.
19country 1 is, in addition, subject to an in￿ ation preference shock pointed in
the opposite direction as the output shock ("1 > 0 in this example), increasing
the distance to the ￿rst-best policy.
The above analysis is reinforced by the comparative statics for optimal
representation ￿￿ (see Appendix 4 for details).18 As one would expect, the
optimal voting weight increases if the correlation between preference and eco-
nomic shocks rises in circumstances in which the country￿ s in￿ ation prefer-
ences are relatively stable and economic volatility is high across the currency
union. Moreover, a country will see its optimal representation in the Council
increase if its economic shocks become more volatile and the correlation be-
tween economic and preference shocks is su¢ ciently positive and large. That
is, unlike in the pervious scenarios, the impact of higher economic volatility
does not depend on whether a country is initially over- or under-represented.
As a consequence, the gap between economic weight and optimal represen-
tation might not be reduced. A related result is that a country might see its
optimal voting weight increase after a marginal rise in preference volatility.
This, too, is in strict contrast with all previous ￿ndings. The intuition is
that the ￿blessings￿hidden in a higher and positive correlation of preference
and economic shocks depend on a certain balance between the two. For ex-
ceedingly volatile preferences, their potentially moderating impact becomes
mute.
5 Relative-Weight Preference Shocks
The principle results of the baseline model with uncertain national in￿ ation
preferences are robust with regard to alternate sources of preference uncer-
tainty. In particular, optimal representation continues to depend not only
on relative economic size but also on the relative characteristics of economic
and preference shocks. As a consequence, over-representation of large and
under-representation of small countries remain a theoretical possibility.
Following Beetsma and Jensen (1998), we allow for preference shocks
regarding the weight on the relative real target. In this case the individual
loss functions of member countries become
Li = (1 + "i)(￿ ￿ ￿
￿)








and ￿ > 0 in line with the ￿rst-best policy. Again focusing
on the two country case, actual central bank policy can be calculated based
on the Lucas supply function (1) and the representation-weighted sum of
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Based on the resulting equilibrium values for in￿ ation and output, we can
compute the expected welfare loss. Minimizing the latter with regard to




















where the subscript ￿￿￿marks the relative-weight preference shock scenario.
Note that 0 < ￿￿
￿ < 1.
Equation (12) reveals similarities and some di⁄erences with the in￿ ation
preference shock case depicted in (8). Comparing ￿￿
￿ and ￿￿, one notes that
the terms involving economic volatility alone are similar. As opposed to what
we saw in (8), however, the volatility of preference shocks in (12) does not
appear independently. Instead, all ￿2
"i terms are weighted by the variance
of economic shocks, ￿2
￿i. This is due to the fact that￿ in a model without
in￿ ationary bias￿ relative-weight preference shocks only impact actual policy
if there is a shock to output. In the absence of economic shocks, that is if
yi = 0, the Council will set in￿ ation equal to the in￿ ation target (which in
this case is constant).
In general, however, optimal representation continues to depend on rela-
tive economic size as well as on the relative characteristics of economic and
preference shocks, just as in the baseline model.
Re￿ ecting the similarities in optimal representation, the condition for
over- and under-representation with relative-weight uncertainty resembles
the condition in the baseline case and over-representation of large and under-
representation of small countries remain a theoretical possibility. The condi-
tion for over- and under-representation becomes
￿
￿









which, except for the weighting of preference volatility, is identical with (9) in
the baseline model. As before, given economic volatility, over-representation
is more likely to be optimal for small and politically relatively stable coun-
tries. If economic shocks were symmetrical, equations (9) and (13) would be
identical.
Rearranging, we ￿nd that the critical value indicating the maximum coun-
21try size for a country to be over-represented, ￿P￿, is implied by
￿
￿










Similar to ￿P in equation (10) in the case with in￿ ation preference shocks,
￿P￿ measures the other country￿ s relative contribution to overall preference
volatility. As before, optimal representation can be interpreted as balancing
preference shock moderation (by bringing ￿￿
￿ closer to preference-uncertainty
based optimal weight ￿P￿) and minimizing misrepresentation of economic size
(by letting ￿￿
￿ approach the ￿rst-best economic weight ￿). As a consequence,
Remarks 1-4 in the baseline case also apply to the case of uncertain relative-
weight preferences.
One di⁄erence between the baseline and the present model is the in￿ uence
of economic volatility on optimal representation. While optimal representa-
tion continues to be decreasing in the volatility of preference shocks in the
present model, an increase in economic volatility now unconditionally reduces
a country￿ s optimal weight in the Council.
When preference uncertainty shifts from the in￿ ation target to the relative
weight, even under-represented countries will have their optimal representa-
tion reduced. The reason is that an increase in economic volatility ampli￿es
the unwanted impact of preference shocks on monetary policy, leading to a
decrease in ￿￿




￿ downward. While the forces that helped create
an increase in optimal representation in the baseline model are still present,
the negative e⁄ect stemming from higher preference-uncertainty always dom-
inates (see Appendix 5).
6 Some Empirical Observations
How does the distribution of ￿i and ￿i look in the example of the ECB?
Under the current ￿one country, one vote￿rule, the relative voting rights of
national governors are strictly symmetrical, that is, ￿i = 1=n, if we disregard
the votes allocated to the Board. As Figure 4 illustrates, for a hypothetical
EMU with 24 members (assuming that the ten EU accession countries as
well as Romania and Bulgaria, have joined the euro area), this will change
if the ECB reform is implemented and EMU enlargement proceeds, giving
way to a (somewhat) more asymmetric voting scheme, in which ￿i will be
22adjusted to better re￿ ect economic size.19





























Figure 4. Political and Economic Weights in the EMU24 Council
To provide some perspective, it is interesting to relate the degree of mis-
representation in today￿ s ECB, as well as in the hypothetical ECB with 24
members depicted in Figure 4, to the example of other federal central banks￿
namely the US Federal Reserve System and the German Bundesbank before
the advent of the euro. Table 1 shows two indicators of misrepresentation
based on the sum of the squared deviation of the voting rights held by a
country or region in the decision-making Council or committee and its GDP
share.
Strikingly, the misrepresentation of economic size in the ECB Council
is about an order of magnitude more severe than in the Fed or, after the
post-uni￿cation reform of 1992, the Bundesbank. This is true if the misrep-
resentation indicator ignores the role of the Board, if we look at an EMU
19Political voting rights assume that the Board does not vote in line with country inter-






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































24with 12 or 24 members, or if we look at the situation before or after the
planned ECB reform. In other words, economic size plays a signi￿cantly
smaller role in the distribution of voting rights within the ECB than in other
federal central banks.
Can the comparatively stark pattern of misrepresentation of size in the
ECB be explained by some of the determinants of optimal representation
identi￿ed by the theoretical model? To answer this question, we need to
￿nd proxies for the latter￿ certainly not an easy feat. While it is straight-
forward to measure relative size (by GDP share, for instance), indicators
of preference stability are less easily identi￿ed. One plausible assumption
is that frequent changes of government are indicative of (or a prerequisite
for) changing preferences. Moreover, such changes might be more signi￿cant
when governments show a high degree of cohesion. Table 2 gives information
on the degree of government cohesion, a measure of government change, and
relative economic size for the existing 12 members of EMU. Table 3 does the
same for the hypothetical EMU with 24 members.
Given the approximate nature of the indicators and, in the case of Ta-
ble 3, the short time-span covered, any interpretation of the data should be
taken with a grain of salt. Nevertheless, a cautious interpretation of Tables
2 and 3 suggests that not all over- and under-representation of national rep-
resentatives on the ECB Council could be easily justi￿ed. In only 5 out of 12
counties in Table 2, and in only 10 out of 24 countries in Table 3, do GDP
share, change, and cohesion point in the same direction. Moreover, it would
seem that actual over- or under-representation of very large and very small
countries is least in line with the suggestions of the model.
7 Concluding Remarks
The question of optimal representation of regional interests within a federal
central bank has received much attention recently. The likely extension of the
euro area has highlighted problems￿ such as a possible mismatch between
relative economic size and voting rights in the decision-making committee￿
with the ￿one country, one vote principle￿in a currency union such as EMU.
The present paper adds central bank independence as a potentially crucial
argument to this discussion. We present a simple model of optimal represen-
tation in a federal central bank in which optimal voting weights re￿ ect two
opposing forces: the wish to insulate common monetary policy from changing
preferences at the national level, and the attempt to avoid an overly active
or passive reaction to idiosyncratic national economic shocks. Adjusting rep-






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































27insulates joint monetary policy from unwanted volatility when national or
regional policy targets deviate from common goals. Basing representation
on economic weight, on the other hand, helps to prevent national or regional
economic shocks from undermining the common goal. Optimal representa-
tion weighs both arguments, re￿ ecting economic size as well as the stochastic
properties of economic and preference shocks.
An important theoretical result is that a perfect match between economic
size and voting rights is rarely optimal, and neither is the ￿once country, one
vote principle￿ . Consequently, whether a country should be over- or under-
represented compared to its relative economic size depends on a number of
di⁄erent forces, including relative size, the relative weight of the real target,
and the stochastic properties of economic and preference shocks. Some might
intuitively expect small countries to be over-represented and large countries
to be under-represented. But there is room for a counter-intuitive result: for
instance, it might be optimal to over-represent a large country if its policy
preferences are very stable relative to other union members.
Taking a closer look at the possible interaction of economic and prefer-
ence shocks, we ￿nd that continued integration in the form of better business
cycle synchronization and more similar preferences can have opposing e⁄ects
on optimal representation. Increasing likeness of preference shocks gives an
incentive to tailor committee voting weights closer to economic size. Increas-
ing likeness of economic shocks has the opposite e⁄ect: relative preference
stability considerations gain in importance as economic shocks become more
similar. Finally, allowing for political business cycle in the sense of a positive
correlation between preference shocks and economic shocks within a coun-
try might help to moderate country 1￿ s policy demands in the Council after
economic shocks.
The basic results of optimal over- or under-representation are fairly robust
with regard to alternative assumptions on shock correlations. Moreover, the
principle ￿ndings seem to be independent of the source of preferences uncer-
tainty. The baseline model assumes uncertain in￿ ation preferences, but opti-
mal representation continues to follow similar determinants when preference
shocks are tied, instead, to the relative weight of the real argument in the na-
tional welfare functions. As a consequence, for instance, over-representation
of large and under-representation of small countries remains a possibility.
Empirically, there are indications that misrepresentation of member coun-
tries in the ECB Council might be extreme and not always optimal. A com-
parison of deviations of actual representation from relative economic size in
the ECB Council with the US Federal Reserve￿ s FOMC and the pre-euro
Bundesbank Council reveals that misrepresentation of economic size in the
ECB is about an order of magnitude more severe. The theoretical model
28suggest two possible explanations. First, preference homogeneity within the
German and the US currency areas might be higher than in today￿ s euro
area or, somewhat less likely, business cycle synchronization could be better
within the euro area. In both cases the model implies that optimal repre-
sentation within the ECB Council (relative to the two other federal central
banks) should focus more on preferences than on economic size. Alterna-
tively, of course, representation within the ECB Council might not be opti-
mal in the ￿rst place. Indeed, even though the empirical proxies used need to
be treated with caution, the ECB pattern of misrepresentation of economic
size is di¢ cult to explain with theoretically identi￿ed determinants of op-
timal representation alone. This suggests further room for discussion, even
after the ECB reform.
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Appendix 1 (Expected welfare under actual policy)
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￿2) ￿ ’"1;"2￿"1￿"2 ￿ 2￿￿
2’￿1;￿2￿￿1￿￿2
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:
Appendix 2: The case with correlated economic shocks
(’￿1;￿2 6= 0)

















34which is always within the permissible range 0 < ￿￿ < 1 (see below).
Conditions for 0 < ￿￿ < 1
Since ￿2
"2;￿2

















1 or (￿￿1 ￿ ￿￿2)
2 ￿ 0￿ which is always ful￿lled. The condition for ￿￿ < 1 is
￿
2










"1 > 0 and ￿ < 1, a su¢ cient condition for the inequality to hold





=2￿￿1￿￿2. This is always ful￿lled.
Conditions for ￿￿ R ￿
As in the baseline model, it holds that
￿
￿ R ￿ , ￿￿
2
"1 Q (1 ￿ ￿)￿
2
"2:
Proof. Going through the same movements as before, we get
￿
￿ R ￿ , ￿￿
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"1 Q (1 ￿ ￿)￿
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￿2 ￿ 2’￿1;￿2￿￿1￿￿2) > 0. As ￿2
"1;￿2












=2￿￿1￿￿2 ￿ 1 because (￿￿1 ￿ ￿￿2)
2 ￿ 0.
Comparative statics
Taking the derivative of (15) with regard to economic volatility, rearrang-
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35Also note that @￿￿=@￿￿1 = 0 when economic shocks are symmetrical in the
sense that ￿￿1 = ￿￿2.
In scenario (a), business cycles are unsynchronized across countries, and
a further increase in economic volatility in country 1 is likely to drive the
economies even more apart. To see this, note that ’￿1;￿2 < ￿￿1=￿￿2 implies ei-
ther a negative correlation between economic shocks or, when the correlation
is positive, that country 1￿ s economy is more (or at least not signi￿cantly
less) volatile than country 2￿ s. In this case, equation (16) demands that
the weight of country 1 in the Council should be increasing if it was initially
under-represented relative to its economic weight; and it should be decreasing
if it was initially over-represented. This helps to reduce the spread between
economic and political weights in the currency union.
The alternative scenario (b) depicts a currency union with positively cor-
related business cycles in which country 1￿ s economy is less volatile than
country 2￿ s￿ thus, somewhat counterintuitively, the economies actually be-
come more similar as ￿￿1 increases.20 In this case, it becomes less costly to
o⁄set in￿ ation preference shocks by allowing voting rights to deviate from
the proportional representation of economic size. As a consequence, equation
(17) requires that the country￿ s optimal weight in monetary policy decisions
be based more on preference shock considerations. To be precise, country
1￿ s optimal representation in the Council increases if it was initially over-
represented relative to its economic weight; and it decreases if it was ini-
tially under-represented. That is, the spread between economic and political
weights in the currency union grows.
Taking the derivative of (15) with regard to the coe¢ cient of correla-
tion, rearranging, and consulting equation (9) yields:
@￿￿
@’￿1;￿2
R 0 , ￿
￿ R ￿:
Finally, it is straightforward to show that higher preference volatility
results in a reduction in optimal representation as in the no-correlation case.
20Note that the identifying inequality for scenario (b), ’￿1;￿2 > ￿￿1=￿￿2, requires
’￿1;￿2 > 0 and ￿￿1 < ￿￿2 since ’￿1;￿2 < 1.
36Appendix 3: The case with correlated preference shocks
(’"1;"2 6= 0)















Conditions for 0 < ￿￿ < 1
The ratio (18) has a positive denominator.21 But the nominator might be
either positive or negative depending on the coe¢ cient of correlation between
preference shocks (’"1;"2), and the relative size of preference instability and


















secures that ￿￿ < 1. The RHS-terms in both inequalities re￿ ect, in turn, the
volatility of preference shocks, country size, and the welfare costs of output
volatility. The LHS of both conditions consists of the covariance of prefer-
ence shocks. Thus, in general, an internal solution for optimal representation
requires that the welfare costs induced by the variance of economic shocks
be large compared to the variance of in￿ ation preferences. Note that a suf-
￿cient condition for an internal solution for optimal representation is that
national shocks to in￿ ation preference di⁄er (only) moderately in terms of
their volatility and correlation. To be more precise:
0 < ￿









Conditions for ￿￿ R ￿
We ￿nd that
￿




















=2￿"1￿"2, which is ful￿lled because ’"1;"2 ￿ 1.
37This implies that over- (under-)representation will always be optimal if a
country￿ s preferences are very stable (very volatile) in relative terms and
preference shocks are su¢ ciently positively correlated across countries. For-
mally:
￿
￿ > ￿ ( ￿"1 < ￿"2 ^ ’"1;"2 > ￿"1=￿"2;
￿
￿ < ￿ ( ￿"2 < ￿"1 ^ ’"1;"2 > ￿"2=￿"1:











, which is always ful￿lled for ￿2
"1 < ’"1;"2￿"1￿"2 <
￿2
"2, or, equivalently, ￿"1=￿"2 < ’"1;"2 < ￿"2=￿"1. Since, by de￿nition,
’"1;"2 ￿ 1, for ￿"1 < ￿"2 this reduces to ’"1;"2 > ￿"1=￿"2. Equivalently,
under-representation requires ’"1;"2 > ￿"2=￿"1 if ￿"2 < ￿"1.
Comparative statics
Starting from an interior solution, an increase in the volatility of prefer-
ence shocks reduces the optimal weight a country holds in the Council.













As shown above, if the RHS-inequality is binding, we also have 0 < ￿￿ < 1.
An increase in economic volatility suggests a higher optimal voting




R 0 , ￿
￿ Q ￿:
Proof. Taking the derivative of (18) with regard to ￿￿1 leads to the condition
@￿￿
@￿￿1













which by equation (19) implies the above.
If the correlation between preference shocks across countries rises,
a country is more likely to see its optimal voting weight increase, if its pref-
erences are relatively stable and it is large in economic terms. To be precise:
@￿￿
@’"1;"2















38Proof. Taking the derivative of (18) with regard to ’"1;"2 yields the above
term, where the RHS of the last inequality is increasing in country 1￿ s relative
economic size, ￿, making the case @￿￿=@’"1;"2 > 0 more probable to hold.
This, trivially, is also true for a higher ￿2
"2 or a lower ￿2
"1.
Appendix 4: The case with correlated economic and
preference shocks (’"1;￿1 6= 0)
Assuming that all cross-country shocks are independent but allowing eco-
nomic and shocks to in￿ ation preferences to be correlated within country 1















While extreme values for ￿￿cannot be excluded in general in this case, the
optimal voting weight is likely to fall into the permissible range 0 < ￿￿ < 1
for a wide range of parameters (see below).
Conditions for 0 < ￿￿ < 1
The denominator of (20) is positive.22 Thus ￿￿ > 0 requires the nominator
to be positive, too. Obviously, this is more likely to be the case if preference
shocks and economic shocks in country 2 are volatile. As far as country 1 is
concerned, inspection of (20) reveals that, because ￿2
"2;￿2
￿2 > 0, a su¢ cient





which is always ful￿lled if the welfare costs associated with economic volatility
exceed the volatility of preferences in country 1 or the correlation between
preference and economic shocks in country 1 is non-positive, i.e. if ’"1;￿1 ￿ 0.














which is likely to be ful￿lled unless the ￿political-economic￿covariance be-
tween preference and economic shocks within country 1, the LHS of the
22The denominator is positive if ￿2
"2 +￿
2￿2




is always non-positive and the inequality always holds because ￿2
"1 > 0 and ’"1;￿1 ￿ 1.
39inequality, takes on extreme values that dominate the RHS, which unam-
biguously increases in the sum of the variances of the economic shocks in
countries 1 and 2 and the preference shock in country 1. Note that this
inequality, too, will always be ful￿lled for non-positive values of ’"1;￿1.
We conclude that an interior solution with 0 < ￿￿ < 1 is more likely
the smaller the coe¢ cient of correlation (with a negative correlation always
implying an interior solution) and the larger the welfare costs of economic
volatility in the currency union.
Conditions for ￿￿ R ￿
We ￿nd:
￿


















Moreover, note that if preference shocks are symmetrical or more volatile
than economic shocks in welfare terms, i.e. ￿"1 ￿ ￿￿￿1, the optimal voting
weight will always decrease as the preferences become less stable.










￿2)￿2￿’"1;￿1￿"1￿￿1 so that ￿￿ = ￿=￿. Then, taking the derivative
of equation (20) with regard to ￿"1, one ￿nds that
@￿￿
@￿"1









In an interior solution: 0 < ￿￿ < 1 and, thus, 0 < ￿ < ￿. This leads to
the su¢ cient condition noted above. Note that 0 < ￿ < 1 implies 2￿"1=(2 ￿
￿)￿￿￿1 > 1 when ￿￿￿1 ￿ ￿"1.


















￿2) ￿ 2￿’"1;￿1￿"1￿￿1 so that ￿￿ = ￿
￿.Taking the derivative of
40equation (20) with regard to ￿"1, one ￿nds that
@￿￿
@￿￿1











In an interior solution: 0 < ￿￿ < 1 and, thus, 0 < ￿ < ￿. This implies the
su¢ cient condition stated in the Result. This scenario is especially plausible
if the initial level of economic volatility (in welfare terms) is small compared
to preference volatility.23
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Appendix 5: Comparative statics with relative-weight
uncertainty
On the one hand, an increase in economic volatility strengthens the eco-
nomic argument underlying the calculation of ￿￿
￿, suggesting higher repre-
sentation for initially under-represented countries. On the other, a higher ￿￿1
decreases ￿￿
￿P, which tends to reduce ￿￿
￿. This latter e⁄ect always dominates.






























"1 R (1 ￿ ￿)￿2
￿2￿2
"2 in (22) represents the condition for over-
and under-representation in (13). That is, in principle, under-representation
works toward a positive impact of ￿￿1 on optimal representation just as in
the baseline model with preference uncertainty regarding the in￿ ation target.
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23The proof suggests that a necessary condition for @￿￿=@￿￿1 to be positive is that
￿￿￿1 < ￿"1. Note that @￿￿=@￿￿1 is always negative if ￿￿￿1 is already very large compared
to ￿"1 in the sense that ￿￿￿1=￿￿1 > (2 ￿ ￿)=2(1 ￿ ￿) > 1.
41In the case of under-representation, we have ￿￿
￿P < ￿￿
￿ < ￿. In contrast
to the result of the baseline model where ￿￿approaches ￿ as ￿￿1 rises when
a country was initially under-represented, here, the distance between ￿￿
￿ and
￿ grows. However, for plausible parameter values ￿￿
￿ does not approach ￿￿
￿P,
either as this moves down even further with ￿￿1 increasing. Technically we
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Again, this is ful￿lled for plausible parameter values (numerical results avail-
able on request).
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